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Abstract. Problem deﬁnition: We investigate the impact of nonbinding (wage-irrelevant)
goals, set by a manager, on a team of workers with “weak-link” production technology.
Can nonbinding goals improve team production when team members face production
complementarity? Academic/practical relevance: Nonbinding goals are easy to implement
and ubiquitous in practice. These goals have been shown to improve individual performance, but it remains to be seen if such goals are effective in team production when there is
production complementarity among workers. Methodology: We ﬁrst develop a theoretical
model where goals act as reference points for workers’ intrinsic motivation to complete
the task. We then test our hypotheses in a controlled, human-subjects experiment. In our
experiment, participants act as managers or workers, and we examine the impact of
nonbinding goals on team outcomes. Results: Consistent with our model, we ﬁnd evidence
that team production does increase when managers are able to set goals. This effect is
strongest when goals are challenging but attainable for weak-link workers. However, we
also ﬁnd evidence that many managers assign goals that are too challenging for weak-link
workers, resulting in suboptimal team production, lower proﬁts, and higher wasted
performance (performance above the weak-link level). Managerial implications: Our
analysis indicates that goals are effective motivators in teams, but some managers may
have difﬁculty overcoming personal biases when setting goals. The task of setting team
goals is more complex than setting individual goals, and many managers can beneﬁt from
training on how to set good goals for the team. Moreover, our ﬁnding that suboptimal
goals also increase wasted performance suggests that improving goal-setting strategies is
especially important in production settings where overperformance is costly for the ﬁrm
(scrap, energy use, inventory costs, lower prices as a result of oversupply, etc.).
Funding: Pennsylvania State Laboratory of Economics, Management and Auctions provided some funding.
Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2019.0793.
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these goals are costless to implement. There is limited research on the impact of goals in teams, especially
in more complex production settings, although evidence from operations management (Doerr et al. 1996,
Linderman et. al 2006) suggests that binding and
nonbinding goals can improve output for pull production and Six Sigma teams. Still, it is unclear whether
nonbinding goals will be effective in production settings with complementarities, where team production
depends on all workers exerting effort. For example, in
project management, all team members must meet
the deadline to avoid late delivery. In software development, developers code large software suites in
pieces, and all developers must ensure that their portion
of the code is bug-free before shipping the ﬁnal product.
In these settings, managers may only be able to set one
goal for the whole team because of fairness concerns
or unobservability of individual worker performance.
When managers do not individualize the goal for
each worker, and the production technology depends

1. Introduction
Setting a goal that does not directly impact a worker’s
earnings is a ubiquitous motivational tool; a manager
may have an informal celebration if an early deadline
is met, send a congratulatory message when the project is completed, or keep a running tally of the number
of days with no workplace accidents to encourage safety.
Under standard utility theory, these goals, commonly
called nonbinding goals, should have no impact on output, and hence, managers should not use them to motivate workers. However, nonbinding goals are seen
everywhere in practice, and evidence from psychology
(Deci 1971, Frey and Jegen 2001, Kamenica 2012) and
managerial economics (Heath et al. 1999; Goerg and
Kube 2012; Gómez-Miñambres 2012; Corgnet et al.
2015, 2018) shows that nonbinding goals can be very
effective motivators. Typically, a nonbinding goal can
increase individual performance by 10%–30% in humansubject experiments. Furthermore, nonbinding goals
are particularly attractive tools for managers because
1026
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on all workers, it is unclear whether nonbinding goals
are still effective.
Therefore, we look to answer the following questions: (1) Can nonbinding goals increase production
in teams? And if so, (2) what goal should managers
set to maximize production? In this paper, we show
that nonbinding goals are powerful enough to motivate a team of workers to increase production, even
when signiﬁcant production complementarities exist. However, managers often set suboptimal goals for
teams. We deﬁne a production setting where teams,
consisting of one manager and three workers, must
coordinate to increase team production; team production and monetary payoffs for everyone are determined by the minimum performance of all workers
(i.e., the “weak link”). To capture the effect of nonmonetary incentives on the team, we allow managers
to assign a nonbinding goal for team production. We
use the weak-link production technology as a strong
test for nonbinding goals. If nonbinding goals are effective in a team setting with the highest degree of
complementarity, these goals should be even more
effective for teams with less complementarity, where
team production also depends on worker performance above the minimum.
Our research is motivated by extensive evidence of
team coordination failure in weak-link production
settings, with individual effort rapidly falling to the
minimum level (see Camerer 2003 and Devetag and
Ortmann 2007 for reviews). In particular, we contribute to the literature by studying how nonbinding,
seemingly payoff-irrelevant goals affect team production with weak-link technology. From a theoretical standpoint, we modify the standard weak-link
coordination game (Van Huyck et al. 1990) by assuming that workers have two sources of motivation:
a standard monetary motivation that depends on the
team production and a nonmonetary motivation that
depends on whether the individual’s performance is
above or below the goal. As a result, a worker’s utility
depends not only on the standard monetary payoffs
and cost of effort but also on whether he or she
achieved the goal. In other words, even if producing
more than the weak link does not entail monetary
rewards, it does provide nonmonetary satisfaction
for workers whose individual performance is above
the goal. We show that when nonbinding goals are
present, two types of workers characterize the solution
of the game: a group of low-ability workers who match
what the weak-link worker does and a group of highability workers who choose to produce above the weaklink level to garner the nonmonetary utility associated with goal attainment. Importantly, we also show
that to maximize team production, a manager must set
a goal that it is challenging but attainable for the weaklink worker and that the optimal goal minimizes high-
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ability workers’ wasted performance (performance
above the weak-link level), minimizing the spread of
performance among team members.
To our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper to theoretically and experimentally examine the impact of
nonbinding goals on team production with weak-link
complementarity. We design a weak-link coordination game using a real effort laboratory experiment,
and we allow managers to set a nonbinding goal for
team production. We chose to use a laboratory experiment so that we could make causal inferences about
the efﬁcacy of nonbinding goals, as well as measure
and control for heterogeneity in worker ability. Consistent with our predictions, we ﬁnd that when managers are able to set goals for the team, team production
increases by 19.8% on average, and as our model predicts, the positive effect of goal setting is especially
strong when goals are challenging but attainable
for the weak-link worker, whose performance determines team production. However, we also ﬁnd that
managers do not always set proﬁt-maximizing goals
for the team, indicating that managers may be setting
goals for other reasons. In particular, we ﬁnd evidence
that managers often disregard the weak-link worker’s
ability, which leads some managers to assign unreasonably difﬁcult goals for the weak-link worker. Finally,
consistent with our theoretical results, we provide evidence that managers who assign unreasonable goals
for the weak link generate not only lower team production but also higher wasted performance; this is,
in part, because goals that are too difﬁcult for the
weak link are more motivational for higher-ability
workers.
1.1. Connection to the Literature
Our research sits at the intersection of the goal-setting
and the coordination in teams literature, which are
well-studied topics in psychology, managerial economics, and, recently, operations management. In
this section, we highlight the streams of literatures
most relevant to our paper and detail our contributions. In the goal-setting literature, the motivational
effect of wage-irrelevant goals has been studied at
length in psychology (see Locke and Latham 2002 for
a review). Psychologists have focused on the motivational and cognitive aspects of goals, stressing
that goals should be SMART, an acronym for speciﬁc, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-based.
More recently, nonbinding goals have been studied in
managerial economics and proven to be effective
motivators for individual workers (Heath et al. 1999;
Goerg and Kube 2012; Gómez-Miñambres 2012;
Corgnet et al. 2015, 2018; Smithers 2015). Rather than
relying on the monetary consequences of their actions, the goals considered in this literature appeal to
the intrinsic motivation of workers (Deci 1971, Frey
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and Jegen 2001, Kamenica 2012). Although a growing number of papers in economics and management
have documented the effectiveness of various forms
of nonmonetary incentives on individual workers,
including performance goals (Wu et al. 2008; Goerg
and Kube 2012; Gómez-Miñambres 2012; Corgnet
et al. 2015, 2018), personal goals in self-control setting (Ainslie 1992, Hsiaw 2013), status incentives
(Charness et al. 2014), symbolic rewards (Kosfeld and
Neckermann 2011), delegation (Fehr et al. 2013), autonomy (Falk and Kosfeld 2006), and trust (Dickinson
and Villeval 2008), little is known about the effectiveness of nonmonetary incentives in teams. Contrary
to the existing literature on goal setting, we focus on a
team environment where the success or failure of a
project relies on the performance of the weakest link.
This is similar to the assembly-line context that Doerr
et al. (1996) study, analyzing the impact of binding
goals under push-versus-pull production policies.
The authors ﬁnd that these incentives have a positive
impact on output under pull production. Our results
show that nonbinding goals also have a positive effect
on team production. The goals that we consider are
nonbinding and hence cheaper and easier to implement in practice.
Our research is also motivated by extensive evidence of team coordination failure in weak-link games,
with effort rapidly falling to the minimum level (see
Camerer 2003 and Devetag and Ortmann 2007 for
reviews). The study of weak-link (or minimum effort) games is common in the economics and operations literature (Van Huyck et al. 1990, Weber 2006,
Brandts et al. 2011, Hyndman et al. 2014, Shokoohyar
et al. 2017) because these games apply to many different production environments. Almost all of these
studies are abstract effort experiments in the sense that
they use the concept of induced valuation to create
individual cost of effort (Smith 1976); if a subject
selects effort level x, then he or she pays a certain
amount c(x) in experimental earnings. Furthermore,
most of these experiments also induce symmetric
costs of effort across the experimental subjects. These
studies ﬁnd that with large groups (three or more subjects), coordination outcomes often converge to the least
efﬁcient equilibrium (see Van Huyck et al. 1990, Knez
and Camerer 1994, Brandts et al. 2011). External inﬂuences, such as pregame communication or intergroup
competition, can induce better outcomes (Van Huyck
et al. 1990, Cooper et al. 1992, Bornstein et al. 2002).
Coordination is a growing topic of research in operations management as well, because coordination
failure can arise in team production environments
such as supplier capacity allocation and project management. For example, Gerchak and Wang (2004)
model how a set of suppliers coordinates when choosing
production quantities to support assembly operations
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for a common customer. Argyres (1999) discusses the
difﬁculty of coordination for the four suppliers of the
B-2 Bomber program and the challenges of on-time
delivery from a project management perspective. From
an experimental point of view, studies have examined
coordination outcomes in two-player newsvendor games
(Hyndman et al. 2014), project management games
where effort accumulates over stages (Shokoohyar
et al. 2017), and group selection games where subjects decide whether to pay a membership fee (Fan
et al. 2018). Again, these studies focus on abstract
effort, which may not capture important psychological
effects from the act of working (such as intrinsic motivation) that can affect coordination outcomes.
Real effort tasks (such as adding rows of numbers
or counting coins) may more closely match actual
team production, where the cost of effort is not symmetric among team members, and they have the added
challenges that players’ cost functions and the “optimal” coordination level are not directly observable.
There are only a few real effort coordination experiments in the literature. The coordination experiment
of Bortolotti et al. (2016) consists of assigning subjects
to teams and having them sort and count coins worth 1,
2, 5, and 10 euro cents within a time limit. The objective
is to minimize the number of counting errors. As in
our experiment, the task is individual, but the payoff
to a team is the minimum of all team members. The
authors ﬁnd that subjects eventually coordinate at
the efﬁcient level of zero errors from all members. The
second real effort coordination experiment was conducted by Vranceanu et al. (2015). The authors use the
task of counting 7’s in a block of random numbers—
correctly reporting the number of 7’s in a block generates one unit of output. Subjects are paired, and
individual proﬁt is a function of the minimum output
as well as individual breaks taken, thought of as the
opportunity cost of working. Higher-performing individuals can also punish their lower-performing counterparts. The study ﬁnds that team performance is
not lower than individual performance, suggesting
high levels of cooperation in pairs, and that the
ability to sanction does not signiﬁcantly improve team
production.
The real effort activity in our experiment consists
of a simple yet tedious slider task activity, ﬁrst used
by Gill and Prowse (2012), where individual effort is
highly correlated with individual performance. Instead of relying on peer pressure or exogenously given
goals, we consider the effect of nonbinding goals set
by managers whose payoff depends on the team production. Thus, we contribute to the literature by introducing nonbinding goals as a potential mechanism to
improve coordination for a group of workers facing
high levels of strategic complementarity. Our ﬁndings
indicate that (1) nonbinding goals can meaningfully
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improve team production, although the level of the
goal is important, and that (2) real effort coordination
outcomes can signiﬁcantly differ from abstract effort
coordination outcomes.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce our theoretical framework, and we
model the potential impact of goals on worker performance and team production. Section 3 describes
the experimental environment, procedures, and hypotheses. Main results are presented in Section 4, and
Section 5 concludes.

2. Model
In this section, we develop a model of a weak-link
coordination game where workers have asymmetric
cost functions and intrinsic motivation, and we establish our experiment hypotheses.
2.1. Setup
In our model, one manager is in charge of a team of
n workers who must complete the project at hand.
The effort of worker i is given by yi ∈ R+ , and we denote by y  [ y1 , . . . , yn ] the vector of possible effort
levels. We assume that a worker’s performance in the
project depends only on his or her exerted effort.
Therefore, we use the terms effort and performance
interchangeably in this paper (although in the online
appendix we consider a model with variability of
performance given the effort). We assume that workers
have a different increasing, twice-differentiable, and
strictly convex cost of effort functions c ( y; θi ). We
interpret parameter θi as worker i’s ability level, with
θi ∈ [ θ, θ̄]. Without loss of generality, we assume that
θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ θn , so θ1 is the ability of the weak-link
worker. We abstract away from moral hazard concerns by assuming that ability is common knowledge
to the manager and workers. We further assume that
c(0; θi )  0 for all θi and that

cy ( y; θn ) ≤ cy ( y; θn−1 ) ≤ ⋯ ≤ cy ( y; θ1 ),
where cy ( y; θi ) is the partial derivative of c ( y; θi ) with
respect to y.
Team production M( y) is determined by the lowest
performance of all workers, so M( y)  min ( y1 , . . . , yn ).
For simplicity, we assume that all n workers as well
as the manager receive identical monetary payoffs
based on M ( y), so the monetary payoffs are given
by A · M( y), where A > 0 reﬂects the proﬁtability of
the team production, and it hence determines the
magnitude of the monetary team incentives. Workers
may also be motivated by nonbinding goals assigned
by the manager. We formalize this effect by considering a goal-dependent, nonmonetary value function
v ( yi − g) that satisﬁes the following prospect theoretic
properties (Kahneman and Tversky 1979):
1. v(0)  0 (goal as a reference point);

2. v′ ( · ) > 0 (increase in production given a goal);
3. for all x > 0, −v (−x)  λv(x), where λ > 1 (goalinduced loss aversion);
4. v′′ (x) > 0, for all x < 0 (convexity for goalinduced losses); and
5. v′′ (x) < 0, for all x > 0 (concavity for goalinduced gains),
where v′ ( · ) and v′′ ( · ) denote the ﬁrst and second derivatives of v ( · ), respectively. Our nonmonetary utility function is motivated by experimental and ﬁeld
evidence showing that wage-irrelevant goals serve as
reference points in a manner that is consistent with
prospect theory (Heath et al. 1999). Properties 4 and 5
capture a prospect theory principle commonly known
as diminishing sensitivity, the idea that outcomes have
a smaller marginal impact when they are more distant from the reference point. Diminishing sensitivity not only gives the value function its characteristic
S shape but also has been found to be the core explanation of the motivational effect of goals as reference points (Wu et al. 2008). Property 3 captures loss
aversion, the property whereby losses loom larger
than gains. Similar speciﬁcations have also been considered by other authors in economics and management literatures (Corgnet et al. 2015, 2018, Dalton
et al. 2016).
A worker’s payoff πw
i is the sum of monetary gains
and nonmonetary utility minus the cost of effort:
πw
i ( yi , y −i , g, A; θi )  A · M( y) + v( yi − g) − c ( yi ; θi ).
Note that we assume that a worker’s nonmonetary
utility function v ( yi − g) is determined by his or her
individual performance relative to the goal. (In the
online appendix, we explore the case where v( · ) depends on the difference between team production and
the goal. We show that the results are equivalent to
when only monetary incentives are present). Therefore, whereas a worker’s monetary payoff depends
only on the team production (as in the standard weaklink game), the worker gets an additional nonmonetary
payoff when his or her performance meets or exceeds
the goal. The last effect represents the satisfaction that a
worker gets from his or her individual performance
regardless of team production—in other words, from
doing his or her part of the project.
Finally, we assume that the manager’s payoff πm
depends only on the production of the team project:
πm (A, y)  A · M( y).
Thus, the manager incurs no cost of effort because he
or she does not participate in production, and his or
her only objective is to maximize team production by
choosing a nonbinding goal g that maximizes his or her
monetary payoffs.
We ﬁrst examine the standard case with no goaldependent utility. Then we show the effects of
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including a nonmonetary, goal-dependent utility
function.
2.2. Coordination Game with Only Monetary Payoffs
In the one-stage, asymmetric cost coordination game
with only monetary motivation, a worker’s payoff
function is given by

πw
i (A, y, yi )  A · M ( y) − c ( yi ; θi ).
The ﬁrst-order condition of worker i’s payoff maximization function is cy ( yi ; θi ) ≤ A. The ﬁrst-order
condition will hold with equality if the agent is the
weak-link worker as well as the only worker producing at the minimum, and it will be cy ( yi ; θi )  0
otherwise (note that when there is more than one
worker producing at the minimum, the proﬁt functions of these workers are kinked in yi ). Thus, when
worker i’s performance is above the minimum, there
is no beneﬁt to choose a higher performance because
team production is determined by the minimum
performance of the team. This insight helps build the
intuition for Proposition 1. All proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
Proposition 1. A vector of effort levels y∗ is a pure strategy

Nash equilibrium to this game if and only if y∗i  y for all i,
where y ∈ [0, ỹ], and ỹ is the solution to cy ( ỹ; θ1 )  A.

Proposition 1 indicates that in equilibrium, workers’
performance is determined by the worker with the
lowest ability (or weak-link worker). Although ỹ puts
an upper bound on best-response choices of y∗i , any
team production level such that y∗i ≤ ỹ can be an
equilibrium.
2.3. Coordination Game with a Goal-Dependent
Nonmonetary Utility
We now study the effects of nonmonetary utility. In
particular, we assume that the worker’s payoff function is given by the combination of monetary and
nonmonetary utilities as well as the cost of effort

πw
i (A, y, yi , g)  A · M ( y) + v ( yi − g) − c ( yi ; θi ).
As a reminder, team production M( y) is determined
by the lowest performance of all team members, so
M ( y)  min ( y1 , . . . , yn ). A worker’s payoff maximization problem changes so that the ﬁrst-order condition is characterized by cy ( yi ; θi ) ≤ A + v ( yi − g).
The left-hand side of this expression represents the
marginal cost, and the right-hand side represents the
marginal utility of effort, which again depends on
team production. Let us deﬁne the variables y(θi , g)
and ȳ(θi , g) to be the effort levels that solve a worker’s
maximization problem when he or she is not the weaklink worker and when he or she is, respectively. In
Proposition 2, we show that in equilibrium, two
groups of workers are formed: low-ability workers

who choose the same effort level as the weak-link worker
and high-ability workers whose goal-dependent marginal utility is high enough for them to choose an
effort level above the minimum.
Proposition 2. Let us deﬁne L(θ1 , g)  {i ∈ N|y(θi , g) ≤

ȳ(θ1 , g)}. A vector of effort levels y∗ is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium if for all i ∈ L(θ1 , g), y∗i  y and y(θ1 , g) ≤
y ≤ ȳ(θ1 , g). For all i ∉ L(θ1 , g), y∗i  y(θi , g).

Proposition 2 indicates that given a goal, there are
potentially two groups of workers in equilibrium. The
ﬁrst group consists of low-ability workers who choose
the same effort level as the weak-link worker, similar to
the case with only monetary incentives in Proposition 1.
This is because low-ability workers have a marginal cost
of effort that is high relative to the marginal nonmonetary utility, and hence, in equilibrium, their strategies
are affected by the team incentives A. Within this
group, the set of best-response effort choices for all
workers is determined by the ability of the weak-link
worker, just as in the case with only monetary payoffs
(Proposition 1). The second group consists of workers
with a sufﬁciently high ability level who choose a level
of effort that maximizes nonmonetary utility minus the
cost of effort and hence is independent of the team
incentives. For high-ability workers, the marginal cost
of effort relative to the marginal goal-dependent nonmonetary utility is low enough for the workers to be
motivated simply by the nonmonetary incentives derived from goal attainment. In this case, workers’ strategies are independent of other workers’ decisions and
hence different from the case with solely monetary
incentives. Therefore, one consequence of our model
is that when workers derive a nonmonetary utility from
their own individual performance, effort levels are actually less coordinated, because high-ability workers
perform above team production in equilibrium.
To better understand the intuition behind this result, let us consider a simple example with n  3. On
the one hand, if a worker is producing above the
minimum, i ∉ L(θ1 , g), his or her optimal level of effort would be given by y∗i  y(θi , g). On the other hand,
the effort of a worker producing at the minimum,
i ∈ L ( ȳ, g), is given by y∗i  ȳ(θi , g). It is clear that the
lowest-ability worker will always be in the low-ability
group (i.e., 1 ∈ L(θ1 , g)). There may be, however, more
workers in this group. Depending on model parameters and y∗ , we have three cases:
1. If y(θ2 , g) > ȳ(θ1 , g), worker θ2 would work more
than the minimum in equilibrium because his or her
effort without monetary motivation is already above
the effort exerted by θ1 . This must also be true for θ3
because y(θ3 , g) > y(θ2 , g). Therefore, in equilibrium,
L(θ1 , g)  {1}, and hence y∗1 < y∗2 < y∗3 .
2. If y(θ2 , g) ≤ ȳ(θ1 , g) < y(θ3 , g), worker θ2 ’s optimal
effort when he or she is above the minimum would be
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lower than y∗1 , which means that, in equilibrium, we
must have y∗1  y∗2 . Otherwise, worker θ2 can increase
his or her payoff by decreasing effort. Therefore, in
equilibrium, L(θ1 , g)  {1, 2}, and hence y∗1  y∗2 < y∗3 .
3. Finally, if y(θ3 , g) ≤ ȳ(θ1 , g), every worker produces the same in equilibrium, L(θ1 , g)  {1, 2, 3}, and
hence y∗1  y∗2  y∗3 . This case is equivalent to the standard case with only monetary motivation.
We now look at the manager’s problem and analyze
how he or she should set the team goal to maximize
team production. To do so, we require an equilibrium
reﬁnement criterion. This is due to the possible multiplicity of equilibria in the low-ability group. Therefore,
we make the assumption that when workers in the
low-ability group face multiple equilibria, they choose
an effort level corresponding with the payoff-dominant
equilibrium y∗i  ȳ(θ1 , g) for all i ∈ L(θ1 , g). This effort
level corresponds to the highest effort the weak-link
worker would willingly exert. The payoff dominance
equilibrium reﬁnement implies a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium where
y∗i

{

ȳ(θ1 , g)
 y(θ , g)
i

if i ∈ L(θ1 , g),
if i ∉ L(θ1 , g) .

We note that determining whether the payoff dominance equilibrium reﬁnement is a reasonable assumption becomes an empirical question. Classic weak-link
coordination experiments with abstract effort rarely
observe the payoff-dominant equilibrium (Van Huyck
et al. 1990, Knez and Camerer 1994, Brandts et al.
2011). In fact, most of these experiments observe outcomes tending toward the least efﬁcient equilibrium.
However, recent coordination experiments (Vranceanu
et al. 2015, Bortolotti et al. 2016) using real effort ﬁnd
the opposite: subjects’ individual performance and
coordination outcomes increase over time and approach the payoff-dominant equilibrium when one
exists. As we show below, our results corroborate the
ﬁndings from previous real effort coordination experiments, and we argue that the assumption of payoff
dominance is reasonable in our setting. The intuition
for Proposition 3 would be qualitatively similar under
other equilibrium reﬁnement assumptions such as
the risk dominance in the low-ability group, where
all workers choose y(θ1 , g), which corresponds with
the least efﬁcient equilibrium.
In the next proposition, we summarize important
results on how the manager should set his or her goal.
These results will help us build hypotheses for our
experiment.
Proposition
3. For the payoff-dominant equilibrium,
∗
dy

(a) dgi > 0 (< 0) if and only if y∗i > g (< g), and
(b) The optimal goal set by the manager is given by g∗ 
argmaxg ȳ(θ1 , g) < y∗1 .

Proposition 3(a) states that a worker’s performance
increases with the goal if his or her performance
exceeds the goal (the goal is attainable), whereas the
opposite is true if the worker’s performance does not
exceed the goal (the goal is unattainable). Therefore,
increasing a goal that is too easy for a worker will be
motivating, whereas increasing a goal that is too
difﬁcult for a worker will have a demotivating effect.
Because the manager is concerned only about monetary
payoffs from team production, which is unaffected by
workers’ performance above the minimum, a proﬁtmaximizing manager focuses on maximizing the
performance of the weak-link worker and hence will
assign the maximum goal that he or she is willing and
able to attain (Proposition 3(b)). Because this goal is
met by the weak-link worker, it will also be attainable by higher-ability workers whose production is
at or above y∗1  ȳ(θ1 , g∗ ). Thus, in equilibrium, all
workers of the team will attain the goal assigned by
the manager.
We ﬁnish our theory section by discussing another
implication of goals as reference points suggested
by Heath et al. (1999)—namely, that difﬁcult but attainable goals lead performance to “pile up” around
the goal. Piling up follows directly from loss aversion
(property 3 of the value function): loss aversion implies that a worker is substantially more motivated
when just short of a goal than farther away from
meeting the goal. In our environment, piling up indicates that the weak-link worker is just motivated
enough to meet g∗ , but if the goal were to be any higher,
the weak-link worker’s performance would decrease
substantially, and the size of this reduction would be
positively related to the loss aversion parameter λ.
Note that this also implies that higher and lower goals
than g∗ would yield a higher variation in performance.
Thus, the optimal goal would have the lowest spread
of work performance. In the next proposition, we
show that wasted performance (performance above
the weak-link level) is minimized at the optimal goal.
Proposition 4. Let us deﬁne Δi ( g)  y(θi , g) − ȳ(θ1 , g) for

i ∉ L(θ1 , g); then Δi ( g∗ ) < Δi ( g), for all g ≠ g∗ .
Proposition 4 is a direct implication of piling up.
Goals that are higher than g∗ may boost high-ability
workers’ performance but decrease the weak-link
worker’s performance, generating not only a lower
team production but also higher wasted performance. Similarly, goals that are lower than g∗ would
decrease the performance of all workers on the team,
but because of piling up, the decrease in the weak-link
worker’s performance will be more pronounced,
leading again to lower team production and higher
wasted performance.
To sum up, the optimal goal not only maximizes
team production (Proposition 3) but also generates
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the lowest variation in performance among team
members, minimizing wasted work performance
(Proposition 4).

3. Experimental Design
We design our experiment to measure the impact of
nonbinding goals on team outcomes. In Section 3.1,
we discuss the real effort task in the experiment, commonly called the slider task. In Section 3.2, we detail the
experimental design and timeline.
3.1. Real Effort Task: Slider Task
We employ the slider task introduced by Gill and
Prowse (2012). The authors describe the task as
consisting
of a single screen displaying a number of sliders. . . .
When the screen containing the effort task is ﬁrst
displayed to the subject all of the sliders are positioned
at 0. . . . By using the mouse, the subject can position
each slider at any integer location between 0 and 100
inclusive. Each slider can be adjusted and readjusted
an unlimited number of times, and the current position
of each slider is displayed to the right of the slider. The
subject’s “points score” in the task is the number of
sliders positioned at 50 at the end of the allotted time.
(Gill and Prowse 2012, p. 472)

We chose this real effort task for our experiment
because of a number of desirable features, which are
also noted in Gill and Prowse (2012). The task is easy
to understand, requires no previous knowledge to
complete, and is tedious to complete. Therefore, performance in the task is highly correlated with effort
exerted.
3.2. Experimental Procedure
Subjects act as managers or workers on a team to
complete the task at hand. Our experiment consists of
two basic treatments, referred to as the baseline and
the goal treatments. Treatments last for 13 rounds; in
each round, subjects have two minutes to complete
as many slider tasks as possible. In all treatments,
subjects ﬁrst attempt the real effort task for three
individual rounds to become familiar with the task
and establish a standard of ability. In these individual
rounds, workers’ payoffs are piece rate and determined by their individual performance. We use these
initial rounds to compute subjects’ ability levels.
In the baseline and goal treatments, players are
randomly assigned to groups of four (one manager
and three workers) and participate in the real effort
weak-link coordination game. In each team round,
workers complete the slider task for two minutes,
after which the team production, the minimum performance among workers, is revealed to the group.
Before the team rounds begin, the performance of
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each worker in the third individual round is revealed
to the team. The manager has the option to complete
the task as well, but his or her performance has no
impact on team production, and it is never revealed to
the workers. We allow managers to complete the task
in case they want to remind themselves of how difﬁcult the task may be. This is important because managers need information about the task difﬁculty to
assign realistic goals. The payoff of all group members
is determined by the minimum performance in each
group. Therefore, every round, all subjects’ monetary
payoffs are identical within each group.
The only difference between the baseline and the
goal-setting treatment is that managers can assign
a nonbinding goal for team production in the goal
treatment, whereas no such an option is available in
the baseline. The groups in the baseline treatment still
have a manager, although managers do not set goals
for the team. Managers are subjects recruited from
workers in a previous session where they get experience with the slider task.
We conducted all experimental sessions at the Laboratory for Economics, Management and Auctions
(LEMA) at Pennsylvania State University between
January 2015 and October 2017. We ran 24 matching
groups of the baseline treatment and 24 matching
groups of the goal treatment, although two groups of
the goal treatment had to be dropped as a result of
network connectivity issues. Therefore, we have 24
teams in the baseline treatment and 22 teams in the
goal treatment, with a total of 184 subjects in our experiment. Our subject pool consisted of undergraduate students recruited through the automated online
recruitment system. The experiment lasted for 1 hour,
and subjects earned on average $14.78 in the baseline treatment and $16.41 in the goal treatment.
3.3. Theoretical Predictions
According to the theoretical analysis presented in
Section 2, we have two different predictions for the
individual effort depending on whether workers
have a nonmonetary utility. If workers do not have a
nonmonetary utility, the outcome of the coordination
game would be consistent with Proposition 1, where
effort is symmetric across all n workers in equilibrium, and the weak-link worker θ1 sets the upper
bound of equilibrium team production.
Hypothesis 1A. If workers only care about monetary pay-

offs, all workers’ performance converges to a level that is a
best response for the weak-link worker in both treatments.
Under the assumption that workers do not have a
nonmonetary utility to complete the task, workers are
only motivated by monetary incentives. Therefore,
workers will not have incentives to perform above
what is a best response for the weak-link worker, as
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shown in Proposition 1. However, if workers derive
a nonmonetary utility from their individual performance that is independent of the team incentives,
the prediction in both treatments could be given
by the equilibria characterized in Proposition 2.
When assigned goals are not present (in the baseline), the reference point is unobserved and idiosyncratic to each worker. Even though in both treatments workers may derive a nonmonetary utility
from their own performance regardless of team incentives, the extensive goal-setting literature [see Locke
and Latham (2002) for a review] indicates that assigned goals foster workers’ motivation relative to
a situation with no goals. Therefore, we can set the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1B. If workers derive a nonmonetary utility

from their own performance,
(a) the average workers’ performance should be higher
than team production in both treatments, and
(b) the average workers’ performance and team production should be higher in the goal treatment than in the
baseline.
It also follows from our theory (Proposition 3(a))
that the goal that maximizes a worker’s performance
is the maximum goal that he or she is willing and able
to achieve; consequently, proﬁt-maximizing managers should assign goals that are challenging but
achievable for the weak-link worker because the weaklink worker’s performance determines team production and hence monetary payoffs (Proposition 3(b)).
Hypothesis 2. In the goal-setting treatment, we expect that

(a) Goals that are challenging but achievable maximize
workers’ performance, and
(b) Managers set goals that are challenging but achievable
for the weak-link worker.
Finally, Proposition 4 indicates that the optimal goal
minimizes wasted performance, the difference between
the worker’s performance and team production.
Hypothesis 3. In the goal-setting treatment, we expect that

goals that are challenging but achievable for the weak-link
worker minimize wasted performance in the team.

4. Results
We start the results section in Section 4.1 by looking
at team production and an individual worker’s performance in the baseline and goal treatments. We then
proceed to look at goals set by the manager in Section 4.2
and study the effect of setting reasonably accurate
goals for the weak-link worker, who determines team
production. In Section 4.3, we study the selection of
team goals by managers in more detail. Finally, in
Section 4.4, we analyze the effect of goal setting on the
dispersion of performance among team members and
wasted performance.

In the analysis of the results, we use workers’ thirdround performance (last round of the individual production phase) as a measure of ability, which we call
task ability. The average task ability for all workers is
13.97 in the baseline treatment and 13.12 in the goal
treatment; although the average task ability is slightly
higher in the baseline treatment, this difference is not
statistically signiﬁcant (t = 1.51, p = 0.134). We deﬁne
weak-link ability as the lowest ability in each group in
round 3. Our results are qualitatively similar and statistically signiﬁcant using several different measures
for worker ability. These include second-round performance and the average or median of the early
rounds’ performance.
4.1. Goal Setting, Team Production, and
Worker Performance
We begin by examining worker performance and
team production in the baseline and goal treatments.
Table 1 provides a summary of average worker performance and team production in the team rounds for
both treatments, as well as the difference between
treatments.
The average worker performance is consistently
above the weak-link worker’s performance in both
treatments. The average effort of all workers in each
group relative to team production is 112.4% in the
goal treatment and 119.2% in the baseline treatment.
This suggests that workers may derive intrinsic utility
from the act of working, in line with Hypothesis 1B(a).
Of course, there are alternative explanations for this
result. For example, workers might work rather than
do nothing as a result of lack of alternatives, a common problem in laboratory experiments known as the
active participation hypothesis. Another possibility is
that the desire not to be the weak-link worker drives
up individual performance. These alternative explanations, however, do not explain why all workers perform better when assigned goals are present, which is a
result consistent with Hypothesis 1B(b). When managers set goals for the team, team production is, on
average, 19.8% higher than with the baseline treatment. This difference is statistically signiﬁcant under
both the Wilcoxon rank-sum (p < 0.01, z = −3.56) and
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (p < 0.01) tests.
In Figure 1, we report team production and
workers’ performance over the 10 rounds in both
Table 1. Average Worker Performance and Team

Production in Team Rounds
Treatment
Baseline
Goal
Difference (Goal − Baseline)
Difference (%)

Worker Performance

Team Production

12.48
14.1
1.62
13.0

10.47
12.55
2.08
19.8
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Figure 1. (Color online) Average Team Production and Workers’ Performance in Both Treatments

treatments. We see not only that are team production
and worker performance above the minimum level of 0
but also that they increase over time in both treatments.
We present a paneled ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression estimate of the effect of goal setting on
team production at the group level in Table 2. We ﬁnd
that team production is signiﬁcantly higher in the goal
treatment at the 0.1% level when controlling for weaklink ability. This implies that the difference in team
production can be attributed to the goal treatment and
not differences in individual workers between treatments. From these results, we conclude that goal setting has a signiﬁcant positive effect on aggregate team
production, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1B(b).
We also see that the time trend is always statistically
signiﬁcant and positive for team production: team
production is increasing over time for both treatments.
Although this ﬁnding is unlike previous weak-link experiments with abstract effort, our result is in line with
other real effort coordination experiments (Vranceanu
Table 2. Paneled OLS Regression on Team Production at

the Group Level (Robust Standard Errors)
Variable
Round
Goal Treatmenta
Weak-link Ability
Constant
Observations
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses.
a
Dummy variable.
**p < 0.05; ****p < 0.001.

(1)
Team Production
0.185****
(0.0453)
2.317****
(0.475)
0.211**
(0.104)
6.514****
(1.268)
460

et al. 2015, Bortolotti et al. 2016). We take a closer look
at what goals managers set in the next section.
Result 1 (Workers’ Performance and Team Production).

Workers’ performance and team production are signiﬁcantly greater in the goal treatment than in the
baseline treatment, in line with Hypothesis 1B.
4.2. Goal Accuracy for the Weak-Link Worker and
Team Production
We now study the effect of goal accuracy in the performance of the weak-link worker, which determines
team production and hence monetary payoffs. The
weak-link worker is fairly consistent within each group;
76% of the time, it is the same worker who determines
team production. From our theory, we predict that
setting the maximum goal the weak-link worker would
attain in equilibrium maximizes his or her individual performance and hence team production (Hypothesis 2(a)).
In Figure 2, we plot the average team production
and average goal set by the manager. On initial inspection, managers appear to be setting goals that are
too challenging for the weak-link worker; the average
goal is 16.6, which is 4.1 units higher than the average
team production. The average goal is so challenging
that there are only 79 rounds out of the possible 220
where the team production meets or exceeds the goal.
This result appears to be inconsistent with our theoretical conjectures.
One possible interpretation of this result is that
managers set goals that are, on average, unattainable
by weak-link workers because, in contrast to our theoretical framework, they ﬁnd these goals to be most
effective. To test the effectiveness of manager’s goalsetting decisions, we need to identify reasonably
accurate goals in the sense of being attainable yet

Fan and Gómez-Miñambres: Nonbinding Goals in Teams
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 1026–1044

1035

Figure 2. (Color online) Goals vs. Team Production

challenging for the weak-link worker. Similar to
Corgnet et al. (2015), we start by using the weak-link
ability, the weak-link worker’s output in round 3, to
establish a basis for what goals are reasonable. However, in our team rounds with strategic complementarity, weak-link ability alone is not a good predictor
of team production, and deﬁning a goal as reasonable
based on this predictor yields no insight. Therefore,
using data from the baseline treatment, we estimate
task ability in the current round as follows:
Predicted task abilityt  α̂1 × lagged team production + α̂2
× double lagged team production,
where α̂1 and α̂2 are estimated from the baseline
treatment data with the following feasible generalized
least squares linear panel regression with no constant:
Team productiont  α1 × lagged production + α2
× double lagged production + εt .
The linear panel feasible generalized least squares model
allows us to suppress the constant while estimating the
weighted coefﬁcients of lagged dependent variables,
unlike generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panels. We obtain α̂1  0.61 and α̂2  0.39, indicating that for the predicted task ability for a given
round, 61% of the weight is placed on last round’s
team production and 39% of the weight is placed on
team production from two rounds ago.
On the basis of the predicted task ability, we deﬁne
the variable Reasonable Goal as a dummy that takes a
value of 1 if the goal lies within a range of two units of
predicted task ability, deﬁned earlier as the weighted
average of the team production from two previous
rounds. We chose a range of 2 for our deﬁnition based

on the standard deviation of team productions, which
is 2.56 in the goal treatment and 2.68 in the baseline treatment. We observe reasonable goals for the
weak-link worker in 117 of the 220 rounds, which is
53.2% of the rounds. Figure 3 shows the distribution
of all goals minus predicted task ability (the red bars
represent reasonable goals).
Next, we separate workers into two groups, weaklink workers and other (higher-ability) workers. As
we indicated earlier, team production (i.e., performance of the weak link) is higher when goals are
reasonable. In particular, weak-link workers on average
complete 12.08 units when the goal is not reasonable
and 13.0 units when the goal is reasonable for them. This
difference is statistically signiﬁcant as the session level
under the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.01). Conversely, the two other workers in the group complete
17.7 units when the goal is not reasonable for the weaklink worker and 17.9 units when the goal is reasonable
for the weak-link worker. This difference is not statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.24). In Figure 4, we report the
aggregate effect of reasonable goals on team production. As noted in Section 4.1, team production is
2.08 units higher in the goal treatment compared with
the baseline treatment, which is an increase of 19%.
When we look at reasonable goals compared with
unreasonable goals, we see an even clearer picture:
aggregate team production under reasonable goals
is 13.0, an increase of 24% compared with the baseline treatment. On the contrary, team production
under unreasonable goals for the weak-link worker
is 12.08, which is only a 15% increase between the baseline and goal treatments. Therefore, we ﬁnd empirical
evidence that setting a reasonable goal for the weak-link
worker is important to team success. Managers who
set reasonable goals for the weak-link worker increase
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Figure 3. (Color online) Distribution of Goals—Predicted Task Ability (Reasonable Goals in Red)

monetary payoffs for their teams by almost 25%,
whereas managers who set unreasonable goals observe much smaller gains to team production.
Although setting reasonable goals for the weaklink worker theoretically (Hypothesis 2(b)) and empirically increases team production, we still ﬁnd that
almost half the managers in our sample seem to assign
goals according to different criteria, which prevents
them from fully capitalizing on the monetary gains of
goal-setting policies. We study the manager’s goal
selection in more detail in the next section, where we
propose a possible interpretation of these results.
Result 2 (Goal Accuracy and Team Production). Man-

agers set reasonable goals for the weak-link worker

in 53.2% of the rounds, so empirical support for Hypothesis 2(b) is ambiguous. Reasonable goals improve
aggregate team production by 24% compared with
the baseline treatment. Unreasonable goals have a
smaller effect. This is clear empirical support for
Hypothesis 2(a).
4.3. Managers’ Goal Selection
We saw in the preceding section that some managers
in our experiment are not setting the goals that
maximize team production. Of the 103 observations
of unreasonable goals, 87 are goals that are above
actual team production; 23 of these goals are at least
10 units above actual team production. These managers may believe that setting increasingly difﬁcult and

Figure 4. (Color online) Reasonable vs. Unreasonable Goals for the Weak-Link Worker and Team Production
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unattainable goals will motivate the weak-link worker to
improve performance, contrary to our theory and empirical evidence, or they may be setting goals for reasons
different from proﬁt maximization. In Table 3, we
present two linear dynamic panel-data models on
goals at the group level when they are unreasonable
and when they are reasonable (we use the Arellano–
Bover/Blundell–Bond generalized method of moments system estimator to avoid endogeneity bias that
may arise in paneled OLS estimations with lagged
dependent and independent variables). In particular,
reasonable goals are correlated with team production
in the previous round, whereas unreasonable goals are
not. The result suggests that managers who set reasonable goals for the weak link update goals based on
feedback from previous team production. However,
managers assigning unreasonable goals do not seem to
consider team production at all. In other words, only
managers who set reasonable goals seem to focus on
the weak link’s previous performance, which our
theory and empirical evidence suggest is the optimal
way of assigning goals.
We also see that the time trend is marginally statistically signiﬁcant and positive for unreasonable
goals, indicating that these managers are setting increasingly difﬁcult goals over time, even though most
team productions are far below these goals. If all
managers were learning to set more motivating goals
over time, we would see the difference between goals
and team productions shrinking over time. Instead,
unreasonable goals become increasingly difﬁcult and
unrealistic compared with team production. Finally,
we look at the correlation between goals and the
ability of the most productive worker, which we call
High Task Ability. This variable measures the thirdTable 3. GMM Linear Dynamic Panel Data Model on Goals

at the Group Level
Variable
Lagged Goal
Lagged Production
Weak-link Ability
High Task Ability
Manager Ability
Round
Constant
Observations

(1)
Unreasonable Goal

(2)
Reasonable Goal

0.224
(0.222)
−0.116
(0.349)
−1.103
(2.080)
1.776*
(0.859)
1.495
(0.923)
1.738*
(0.784)
−35.78
(30.20)
81

0.0185
(0.0663)
0.319***
(0.0921)
0.273
(0.450)
0.0637
(0.223)
0.186
(0.120)
−0.0826
(0.0979)
3.814
(2.334)
117

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10; ***p < 0.01.
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round performance of the most productive worker
on the team, similar to weak-link ability. For goals
that are unreasonable, the most productive worker’s
ability is marginally correlated with the goal, whereas
team production is not. This evidence suggests that
some managers are setting goals that are appropriate
for the best workers of the team, but these goals are
too difﬁcult for the weak link. This failure to adapt
goal-setting strategy in a team production environment lowers proﬁts for all team members. In Table A.1
in the appendix, we consider an alternative model
speciﬁcation where we categorize managers as reasonable managers if they set seven or more reasonable
goals out of the 10 team rounds. Similar to the results
in Table 3, we observe that reasonable managers set
goals correlated with team production in the previous round, whereas unreasonable managers do not.
Unreasonable managers set goals correlated with
high task ability.
Our results are in line with other economic, psychology, and management science studies, which ﬁnd
that some managers are reluctant to adapt their strategies to feedback on workers’ characteristics. For example, using data from a company that provide online
job testing services, Hoffman et al. (2018) study the
effects of job testing on managerial hiring decisions
and performance. The authors found that human resource managers who frequently use their discretion to
override the results of a proprietary skills test hired
workers who performed worse than workers hired by
other managers. Similarly, in a laboratory experiment,
Corgnet and Hernán González (2014) report evidence
that consulting workers was beneﬁcial to managers as
long as they follow the workers’ advice; nevertheless,
most managers were reluctant to change their mind
and adopt the workers’ proposal. Thus, most managers ignore proposals in favor of their original plan
despite the monetary costs. This rigidity of mind may
arise because people focus too much on their own
beliefs instead of adapting their strategies to somebody else’s feedback. In other words, managers may
suffer from the well-documented self-serving bias
(Loewenstein et al. 1993, Babcock et al. 1996, Babcock
and Loewenstein 1997). In line with this idea, some managers in our experiment may believe that all workers
should achieve the performance dictated by the highestability workers without paying proper attention to the
negative motivational effects of setting too challenging goals for weak-link workers. When these workers
fail to reach the goal, some managers ignore this feedback and do not adjust their strategy even when it
is in their material interest to do so. The observation that
some managers misunderstand or ignore feedback is
common in the operations and management literature as well. For example, Sterman (1989) ﬁnds that
human subjects experience several “misperceptions
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of feedback” in a multitier inventory distribution system with time delay, commonly known as the beer game.
The misperceptions of feedback result in the bullwhip effect, and Chen et al. (2000) demonstrate that
the behavioral phenomenon does not disappear even
with centralized demand information.
Result 3 (Managerial Goal Selection). Although 53.2% of

the time managers set reasonable goals, some managers persistently set unreasonable goals that increase
in difﬁculty over time. This ﬁnding is contrary to Hypothesis 2(b) and suggests that some managers have
alternative strategies on how to set goals—strategies
that are suboptimal from the point of view of proﬁt
maximization.

the other two higher-ability workers, because, by
deﬁnition, the weak-link worker wasted performance
is 0. We note that there is no statistical difference in
wasted performance between the baseline and goal
treatments. However, when we analyze wasted performance in the goal treatment and separate observations
by when there is an unreasonable versus reasonable goal, we ﬁnd that wasted performance is signiﬁcantly higher at the session level when workers face
an unreasonable goal. This ﬁnding is consistent with
Hypothesis 3: reasonable goals that are challenging
but attainable for the weak-link worker minimize
wasted performance and hence decrease the standard deviation of performance.
Result 4 (Wasted Performance). The standard de-

4.4. Dispersion of Workers Performance and
Wasted Performance
Finally, we look at the dispersion of workers’ performance within each treatment. Table 4 summarizes
the mean and standard deviation of all workers’ performance, as well as the mean and standard deviation of weak-link workers’ performance versus other
workers, and the test of equality of standard deviations statistics between the baseline and goal treatments, both at the session level. We see that there is
greater dispersion of performance when goals are
present. This empirically suggests that, on average,
goals set by managers act as a motivation device
rather than a coordination device. Thus, goals increase all workers performance, but they also disperse individual worker performance.
To understand why goals increase the standard
deviation of workers performance, we introduce the
variable Wasted Performance, which we deﬁne as a
worker’s performance above the weak-link worker’s
level. As we explained in Section 4.1, we chose the
label wasted because performance levels above the
minimum do not result in monetary earnings. Our
theory suggests that because of piling up, wasted
performance is minimized when goals are challenging but attainable for the weak-link worker. Table 5
presents results from a Z-test of equality of means,
clustered by session, for wasted performance from

viation of workers’ performance is higher when goals
are present. We show that this is because unreasonable goals signiﬁcantly increase wasted performance.
However, reasonable goals signiﬁcantly decrease
wasted performance and hence the spread of performance among workers in the team. These results are
consistent with Hypothesis 3.

5. Discussion
In this study, we test the efﬁcacy of nonbinding goals
in teams where production depends on the weak-link
worker. To do so, we model team production as a real
effort weak-link coordination game among workers,
where managers can set a goal for the team. We ﬁnd
that nonbinding goals are effective motivators for
teams in our experiment. In particular, aggregate
team production increases by 19.8% when goals are
present, and this positive effect is more pronounced
when the goal is reasonable for the weak-link worker.
The positive effect of goals on teams’ production
holds even when controlling for measures of workers’
individual ability within groups. We also ﬁnd that
in the absence of goals, team production does not fall
to the worst possible outcome of zero. This ﬁnding
differs from the large body of literature on abstract
effort minimum coordination games, where convergence to the least efﬁcient equilibrium is the norm, but
is consistent with other real effort experiments.

Table 4. Test of Equality of Standard Deviations for Workers’ Performance at the
Group Level
Workers
All workers
Weak-link workers (Team outcome)
Other workers

Treatment

N

Mean

Std. dev.

F-test

Baseline
Goal
Baseline
Goal
Baseline
Goal

122
114
54
52
68
62

13.27
15.02
11.06
12.57
15.55
17.74

3.05
3.72
2.00
2.39
2.57
3.39

p = 0.02
Reject
p = 0.11
Fail to reject
p = 0.01
Reject
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Table 5. Z-Test of Equality of Means for Wasted

Performance at the Group Level
Treatment
Baseline
Goal
Unreasonable goal
Reasonable goal

N

Clusters

Mean

t-Test

456
416
198
218

24
22
22
21

5.19
5.26
5.46
5.09

p = 0.57
Fail to reject
p = 0.03
Reject

Our paper shows that workers on teams respond
to nonmonetary incentives such as goal setting. Using nonbinding managerial goals in organizations is
particularly appealing because these goals are easy
and costless to implement. Furthermore, these goals
can signiﬁcantly increase team production while also
avoiding conﬂicts of interest between management and
workers. When a goal is binding, the ﬁrm or manager
must pay the monetary incentive when the goal is met;
this can lead the ﬁrm or manager to set goals that do
not maximize team production. Nonbinding goals can
align the incentives of both parties.
Our results also indicate that not all goals are equally
effective. In particular, we ﬁnd that setting unrealistic
team goals (goals that are too difﬁcult for the weak-link
worker) is much less effective than setting reasonable goals. Unfortunately, almost half of the time, our
managers set goals that are too difﬁcult, and this effect
is persistent. We argue that this important result is
consistent with similar ﬁndings in the literature on selfserving biases. Our results suggest that it would be
beneﬁcial to train managers to overcome their rigidity
of mind when setting goals for others. Through training, organizations can teach managers to overcome
personal idiosyncrasies and assign better goals for their
teams. When managers are able to empathize with their
weak-link workers and use available information to set
challenging yet achievable goals for them, teams as
well as managers beneﬁt. Moreover, our ﬁnding that
suboptimal goals also increase wasted performance
suggests that improving goal-setting strategies is especially important in production settings where overperformance is costly for the ﬁrm (scrap, energy use, inventory costs, lower prices as a result of oversupply, etc.).
Our ﬁndings suggest several interesting lines for
future research. First, the result that some managers
are unsuccessful at setting optimal goals even when
the necessary information is at their disposal motivates the question of how to minimize the impact of
managerial mistakes or biases in setting team goals.
Firms may adopt policies to improve managers’ goalsetting behavior, such as increasing feedback about
goals that are challenging but attainable for the weak
link. Moreover, it would be interesting to delve more
into the role that managerial leadership has on goal
effectiveness in teams. In our experiment, we focus on
a vertical leadership environment in which managers

are always in charge of goal setting; however, one might
imagine that workers might be more committed to
attain team goals when they participate in setting them
(horizontal leadership) or when the manager simply
asks for the workers’ opinion before assigning the
goals (consultative leadership). Different leadership
structures may moderate the impact of nonbinding
goals and intrinsic motivation on worker performance
and team production. From a theoretical standpoint,
our model could be generalized to consider randomness in workers’ production, which would lead to a
more complex probability distribution over outcomes
and hence additional coordination problems. Finally,
it is worth exploring the impact of binding goals on
teams with diverse production technologies. Binding goals such as sales quotas and project deadlines
directly affect a worker’s monetary incentives, and
these goals are commonplace as well. Whether managers set optimal binding goals and what impact these
goals have on team production remain important open
questions.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
First, we show that yi  y−i with 0 ≤ yi ≤ ỹ is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose that yi  y∗ for all i and 0 ≤ y ≤ ỹ. Now
suppose that worker i chooses yi > y. Worker i’s payoff is
given by πw
i (yi , y−i )  A ·M (y) − c(yi ; θi )<A ·M (y) − c(y;θi ) 
∗
πw
i (y ). This is because c(·) is increasing in y for all workers.
Therefore, worker i has no incentive to increase effort above y∗ .
Now consider any yi < y. In other words, worker i unilaterally sets the minimum. By assumption, 0 ≤ y ≤ ỹ, and in
this range πw (yi , y−i ) < πw (y, y−i ). This is to say, in this
range, the monetary payoff from a higher team production
level outweighs the increased cost of effort for all workers.
Therefore, a worker has no incentive to decrease effort.
Now we show that any Nash equilibrium to this game
satisﬁes yi  y−i with 0 ≤ yi ≤ ỹ. Suppose that y∗ is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. First assume that y∗ is not a
constant vector. Then there exists yi > M (y) for some i, so
worker i can increase proﬁts by setting yi  M (y). Doing so
will decrease his or her cost of effort without decreasing his
or her monetary payoffs. Now assume that y∗ > ỹ. For any
worker with ability parameter θ1 , his or her proﬁt function
is decreasing in this range. He or she can increase proﬁts by
choosing yi < y∗ . □
Proof of Proposition 2
Following Wu et al. (2008), we consider a special case of
optimization referred to as myopic optimization. We require
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this assumption because solutions of the optimization
problem with a prospect theory value function are not
necessarily unique. □
Assumption A.1 (Myopic Optimization). The worker stops
performing when the marginal cost of obtaining an additional unit
ﬁrst exceeds the marginal beneﬁt of obtaining that unit. Thus, the
optimal performance is given by y∗  min{y1 , . . . , yn }, where
y1 , . . ., yn are solutions to v (y − g)  cy (y; θ).
In essence, Assumption A.1 guarantees that the solution
will be the minimum performance of all possible equilibria.
Thus, without this assumption, the optimal work performance that we compute below could be higher, but none of
our qualitative results, in particular the relationship between work performance and goal setting, would change.
To prove Proposition 2, we established the following
lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let Assumption A.1 hold. Then v (y∗ − g) <
cyy (y∗ ; θ).
Proof of Lemma 1. Because y∗ is the proﬁt-maximizing performance given goal g, v (y∗ − g)  cy (y∗ ; θ). Because v( · )
is concave for gains and c( · ) is convex, Assumption A.1 implies
v (y∗ − g − ε) > cy (y∗ − ε; θ). Therefore, v (y∗ − g) < cyy (y∗ ; θ).
Note that Lemma A.1 ensures that second-order condition
for the performance that maximizes worker’s overall utility
πw ( · )  A · M (y) + v (yi − g) − c(yi ; θi ) holds.
Let us consider θ ∈ [θ1 , θn ]. A worker with ability θ producing above the minimum is not affected by monetary
incentives, and his or her best-response effort choice is
characterized by
y(θ, g)  {y : v (y − g)  cy (y; θ)}.

(A.1)

Alternatively, a worker producing at the minimum is affected by monetary incentives, and his or her best-response
effort choice is given by
ȳ(θ, g)  {y : A + v (y − g)  cy (y; θ)}.

(A.2)

Note that for A > 0, y(θ, g) < ȳ(θ, g) for all workers. We
ﬁrst prove that both ȳ( · ) and y( · ) increase in θ for a given g.
Note that by differentiating ȳ(θ, g) or y(θ, g) with respect
to θ and using the implicit function theorem, we get
v (y − g)

dy
dy
 cyy (y; θ) + cyθ (y; θ),
dθ
dθ

where y stands for either ȳ( · ) or y( · ). By rearranging terms,
we get
cyθ ( y; θ)
dy
.

dθ v (y − g) − cyy (y; θ)
The denominator of this expression is negative because of
Lemma A.1, whereas the numerator is negative by the propdy
erties of c( · ). Hence, dθ
> 0, and both ȳ( · ) and y( · ) increase
in θ for a given g.
Now, for a given g ≥ 0, let us deﬁne the threshold ability level θ̃(θ1 ) as y(θ̃(θ1 ) , g)  ȳ(θ1 , g). Note that because
both y( · ) and ȳ( · ) increase in θ, θ ≥ θ̃(θ1 ) if and only if
ȳ(θ1 , g) ≤ y(θ, g). Therefore, we can deﬁne the low-ability

workers group as L(θ1 , g)  {i ∈ N|y(θi , g) ≤ ȳ(θ1 , g)}, which
has cardinality of at least 1; thus, θ1 will always be in this
group. If |L(θ1 , g)|  1, worker θ1 is the only low-ability
worker, and his or her best-response effort level is the solution to A + v (y − g)  cy (y; θ1 ). This is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
If |L(θ1 , g)| ≥ 2 then, applying the logic of Proposition 1, we
see that for all i ∈ L(θ1 , g), yi  y∗ , where y(θ1 , g) ≤ y∗ ≤ ȳ(θ1 , g).
Finally, for all i ∉ L(θ1 , g), it holds that y(θi , g) > ȳ(θ1 , g).
Hence, in equilibrium, these workers’ best-response effort levels are not affected by monetary team incentives, and
yi  ȳ(θi , g)  {y : v (y − g)  cy (y; θi )} is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. □
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove Proposition 3, we assume a widely accepted
equilibrium reﬁnement criterion that states that when
workers in the low-ability group face multiple equilibria in
the coordination game, they choose an effort level corresponding to the payoff-dominant equilibrium. □
Assumption A.2 (Payoff Dominance). Low-ability workers
with ability parameters θ1 , . . . , θm choose the symmetric bestresponse effort level that yields the payoff-dominant equilibrium
in the coordination game. In our context, the effort level is the
solution to A + v (y − g)  cy ( y; θ1 ). This effort level is the
maximum effort the weak-link worker would willingly exert.
Given Assumption A.2, there is a unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in this game, where low-ability workers
exert effort yi  ȳ(θ1 , g)  {y : A + v ( y − g)  cy (y; θ1 )} and
high-ability workers exert effort yi  y(θi , g)  {y :v ( y − g) 
cy (y;θi )}.
The proof of Proposition 3(a) is based on the Wu et al.
(2008) analysis of a goal-dependent prospect theory value
function with exogenously given goals. This result is similar to proposition 1 in Wu et al. (2008).
Given Proposition 2 and Assumption A.2, the optimal
production is given by
{
ȳ(θ1 , g) if i ∈ L( ȳ, g),
y∗i  y(θ , g) if i ∉ L( ȳ, g) .
i

Let us start by showing how goals affect the effort of
workers in the high-ability group (i ∉ L(θ1 , g)). Given a goal,
the optimal performance for high-ability workers is characterized by Equation (A.1):
v (y(θ, g) − g)  cy (y(θ, g); θ).
Using the implicit function theorem and differentiating
both sides with respect to g, we get
(
)
dy(θ,g)
dy(θ, g)
′′ ( y(θ,g)−g) dg −1
v
 cyy (y(θ, g); θ)
dg
dy(θ, g)
v (y(θ, g) − g)
 
.
⇒
dg
v (y(θ, g) − g) − cyy ( y(θ, g); θ)
The denominator of this expression must be negative at
the optimal performance level because it is the second-order
condition for an effort level that maximizes a worker’s overdy(θ, g)
all utility. Therefore, dg and v (y(θ, g) − g) must have
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Figure A.1. (Color online) Plot of ĝ and ŷ

opposite signs. Moreover, note that by properties 4 and 5 of
v (y − g), we know that v (y(θ, g) − g) > 0(< 0) if and only if
y(θ, g) < g (> g). This means that higher goals improve the
performance of a high-ability worker, if his or her performance
exceeds the goals (the goal is attainable for him or her) but
decreases performance if his or her performance does not
exceed the goal (the goal is not attainable for him or her). Thus,
dy(θ, g)
dg > 0 (< 0) if and only if y(θ, g) > g (< g).
Similarly, given a goal, the optimal performance for
workers in the low-ability group (i ∈ L(θ1 , g)) is given by
Equation (A.2):
A + v ( ȳ(θ1 , g) − g) − cy ( ȳ(θ1 , g); θ1 ).
Figure A.2. (Color online) Plot of g∗ and ȳ(θ1 , g∗ )

By deriving both sides of this expression with respect
to g, we get
)
(
dȳ(θ1 , g)
dȳ(θ1 , g)

v ( ȳ(θ1 , g) − g)
− 1  cyy ( ȳ(θ1 , g); θ)
dg
dg
dȳ(θ1 , g)
v ( ȳ(θ1 , g) − g)
 
.
⇒
dg
v ( ȳ(θ1 , g) − g) − cyy ( ȳ(θ1 , g); θ1 )
Using the same argument, dȳ(θdg1 , g) > 0 (< 0) if and only if
ȳ(θ1 , g) > g (< g).
We now proceed to prove Proposition 3(b). Note that a
proﬁt-maximizing manager should focus on maximizing the
performance of the weak-link worker, the only one determining
the team’s production. In Proposition 3(a), we showed that

Fan and Gómez-Miñambres: Nonbinding Goals in Teams

1042

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 1026–1044

Figure A.3. (Color online) Wasted Performance of the Highest-Ability Worker Under the Optimal Goal (Left-Hand Side) and a

Higher Goal (Right-Hand Side)

this goal corresponds to the maximum goal that the weak-link
worker is willing and able to attain (i.e., g∗  argmaxg ȳ(θ1 , g)).
To compute g∗ , we start by deﬁning ĝ as the minimum
goal that the weak-link worker would fail to attain and ŷ as
its corresponding performance (see Figure A.1).
From Equation (A.2), we know that
A + v ( ŷ − ĝ)  cy ( ŷ; θ1 ).
By deriving both sides of this equation with respect to ŷ,
we get


v ( ŷ − ĝ)  cyy ( ŷ; θ1 ).
We can compute ĝ and ŷ by solving the following system
of equations:
v ( ŷ − ĝ)  cyy ( ŷ; θ1 ),
v ( ŷ − ĝ)  cy ( ŷ; θ1 ).
Finally, note that because ĝ is the minimum goal that the
weak-link worker would fail to attain, the maximum goal

that he or she could attain is slightly lower. Thus, g∗  ĝ − ε
with ε → 0, as shown in Figure A.2.
□
Proof of Proposition 4
This proof is based on the proof of proposition 5 in Wu et al.
(2008). First, we formalize the notion of piling up. Let us call
G(δ; θ, λ) the set of goals in which performance exceeds a
particular goal by δ or less. Thus, if g ∈ G(δ; θ, λ), then
0 ≤ yi − g ≤ δ.
□
To check how piling up is related to loss aversion in our
environment, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.2 (Piling Up). There exists a sufﬁciently high
level of loss aversion λ > 1 such that if g ∈ G(δ; θi , 1), then g ∈
G(δ; θ1 , λ), where i ∉ L(θ1 , g).
Proof of Lemma A.2. If g ∈ G(δ; θ1 , 1), Lemma A.2 clearly
holds. Thus, we must consider the case in which g ∈ G(δ; θi , 1)
and g ∉ G(δ; θ1 , 1). The latter implies that the goal g that is
attained by worker i is not attained by the weak link. Thus,

Figure A.4. (Color online) Wasted Performance of the Highest-Ability Worker Under the Optimal Goal (Left-Hand Side) and a

Lower Goal (Right-Hand Side)
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Table A.1. GMM Linear Dynamic Panel Data Model on
Goals at the Group Level, Sorted by Manager Type
Variable
Lagged Goal
Lagged Production
Weak-link Ability
High Task Ability
Manager Ability
Round
Constant
Observations

(1)
Unreasonable Manager

(2)
Reasonable Manager

0.0886
(0.158)
−0.0615
(0.339)
−4.152*
(2.108)
5.689***
(1.378)
2.077
(1.384)
0.896
(0.498)
−71.27***
(21.09)
108

0.00141
(0.110)
0.467***
(0.0967)
0.0322
(0.433)
0.102
(0.542)
0.263
(0.152)
0.0174
(0.0742)
1.858
(3.339)
90

Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. We deﬁne a reasonable
manager as one who sets seven or more reasonable goals in the 10
team rounds.
*p < 0.10; ***p < 0.01.

for some y1 < g, A − v (g − y1 )  cy (y1 ; θ1 ). Hence, because
v (g − y1 ) < 0, for λ > 1, A − λv (g − y1 ) > cy ( y1 ; θ1 ). Therefore, when λ > 1, the production of the weak link y1 is
higher than when λ  1; for a sufﬁciently high λ, it must be
the case that y1 > g, so A + v ( y1 − g)  cy ( y1 ; θ1 ).
Lemma A.2 indicates that a loss-averse weak-link
worker is willing to just attain a goal that a higherability worker without loss aversion also attains, as long as
loss aversion is sufﬁciently high.
Proposition 4 is a direct consequence of this result (piling
up). When workers are below their goals, they receive high
beneﬁts from removing a “loss,” and these incentives increase with the level of loss aversion. However, once they
reach their goal and enter the domain of gains, the marginal
beneﬁts of additional performance will be substantially
smaller. The optimal goal that we described in Proposition 3(b), g∗ , is the maximum goal that the weak-link worker
is willing and able to attain; given this goal, the weak-link
worker exceeds the goal by a small margin (see Figure A.2).
However, if the goal is any higher—ĝ  g∗ + ε for an arbitrarily small ε—his or her performance would be substantially lower (see Figure A.1), increasing the difference
in performance between high-ability workers and the weak
link (wasted performance) Δi (g). To illustrate, consider an
example where n  3 and L(θ1 , g)  {1}. Thus, there are three
workers: the weak link and two higher-ability workers
who produce above the weak link’s level in equilibrium.
Figure A.3 shows the case in which the goal is higher than
the optimal goal gH > g∗ . In this case, the weak-link worker
does not meet the goal gH , and the wasted performance of
the highest-ability worker is higher than with the optimal
goal Δ3 (gH ) > Δ3 (g∗ ). Similarly, when the goal is less than
gL < g∗ , all workers exceed the goal by a generous margin,
but just as in the high-goals case, wasted performance is
higher than under optimal goals (see Figure A.4). Therefore,
low and high goals yield the highest wasted performance

of high-ability workers, whereas the optimal goal induces
the lowest dispersion. □
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